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Mastering the Guilds’ Debts in Eighteenth-Century Paris:
Royal Scrutiny, Debt Reduction and State Coercion
MathieuMARRAUD*
Abstract. The French guilds, like all the corporate bodies, were asked to contribute
to the King’s ýnances. This paper looks at the work of a royal commission – the
Commission pour la révision des comptes des communautés d’arts et métiers – which
was set up in 1716 to examine the ýnancial situation of the guilds. The commission
used its power to closely monitor and impose a number of constraints on the ways in
which the guilds managed their revenue, expenditure and debt. Control by the state of
the guilds’ ýnances was used to facilitate the political integration of guilds into royal
administration. In this respect, the development of the king’s debts made it possible for
the monarchy to take control of its corporate bodies which, initially, had only consented
to act as intermediaries to support the king’s credit.
Keywords. Guilds, Public debt,Taxes, Fiscality, Royal Control
Résumé. Maîtriser la dette des corporations parisiennes au XVIIIe siècle : contrôle
monarchique, effets libératoires et coercitifs. Comme tous les corps institués, les
corporations durent soutenir les ýnances royales au cours du XVIIIe siècle. Cet article
évoque le travail d’une commission royale – la Commission pour la révision des comptes
des communautés d’arts et métiers –, établie en 1716 en vue de faire l’examen des
situations ýnancières propres aux corporations, avant l’irruption d’un certain nombre
d’édits royaux dans les années 1740. La commission usa en réalité de son pouvoir pour
diriger et contraindre les postes de recettes et de dépenses relatifs aux communautés.
Le contrôle étatique et ýnancier exercé sur elles servait alors à faciliter leur intégration
politique au sein de l’administration royale. De ce point de vue, les dettes royales
rendaient possible la mise sous contrôle de corps dont le rôle d’intermédiaires avait
permis de secourir le crédit de la monarchie.
Mots-clés. Corporations, dette publique, impôts, ýscalité, contrôle royal
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Thequestionof theguilds’ debts – and theorigins of their indebtedness –
in the Old Regime is part of a long historical tradition in France. Guilds’
debts have been generally equated with the shortcomings of self-government
and the misappropriation of common funds. According to historians, debts
explain the collapse of the guild system in the eighteenth century, a causal
link which was already put forward by reformers under Louis XV and
Louis XVI.1 The reasons for Turgot’s abolition of the guilds in February
1776 are numerous. Guilds were abolished for their backwardness, their
public uselessness, their hindering of free commercial settlement in urban
areas, and for slowing down the introduction of new technologies by means
of an overabundance of rules and control over production. Above all Turgot
abolished guilds because the King’s Council had been persuaded, as early
as 1710, that they carried a perpetual debt.2 At the beginning of 1776, the
Parisian guilds still owed 4.5 million livres to their creditors, a capital sum
which, at the 4% interest rate, cost 180,000 livres per year.3 Although a lack
of primary sources makes it difýcult to conýrm the data, these ýgures are
probably an accurate reþection of the ýnancial reality.
By and large, historians in their work have repeated the ofýcial
discourse about the abolition of the guilds. Even today, most debates on their
suppression adopt essentially the same terms as those which supporters and
detractors were in the habit of using then.4 Although eighteenth-century
criticism reþects an undeniable reality about guilds and their administration,
it is important to note that the vocabulary used in discussion of the guilds
belongs to a particular language which was typical of the Old Regime
monarchical culture.
The speciýc purpose here is to look again at the debate between guilds
and royal authorities on the question of “public” debt, including the origin
of the debt, its nature, and of course its payment. While it is clear that there
was no so such thing as a public debt funded by all the subjects, on the
other hand the authorities that were in charge of raising credit obviously
developed discourses that extended far beyond the royal service per se.5
1. H. L. ROOT, 1994, p. 135-136; R. NIGEON, 1934.
2. S. L. KAPLAN, 2001, p. 34-35, 40-43, 237-241.
3. Archives de la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Paris (A.C.C.I.P.), X 1-00(2),
“Memoire sur les moyens de suppléer aux ressources que l’Etat trouvoit dans les ýnances ou
dans le crédit des communautés de Paris”, n.d. [1776].
4. P.MINARD, 2004.
5. J.-Y. GRENIER, 2006.
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Guilds gradually adopted this kind of discourse over the eighteenth century.
The Royal Treasury never stopped looking for new ways of funding the
war effort. Among others, guilds were asked to contribute to large sums.
For guilds revenue put them in a position to service loans worth dozens of
millions of livres tournois. Of course the king then had to put up with the
drawbacks of an insolvency on the part of the guilds, which he himself had
created. It remains to be seen how he managed to contain and resolve it, and
what was the structural goal he was seeking. What was the signiýcance of
the administrative solution he implemented in respect to guilds’ autonomy
up until the 1740s? In many ways, the king used the guilds’ treasury as
a means of preparing and achieving their abolition a few decades before
Turgot’s famous edicts of 1776.
1. Taxing commerce through its institutions
This article focuses on the Six Corps des marchands (or SixMerchants’
bodies) which was one among the many Parisian merchant guilds. These
ones had developed from the early ýfteenth-century royal and urban rituals,
especially on the occasion of Royal Entries where the heads of the guilds
held the royal canopy as the procession progressed on its route through the
Parisian streets. In the late sixteenth century, guilds which had common
or related economic and legal interests were federated into the guild of the
Six Corps des Marchands. In many respects, the Six Corps remained, up
until their abolition, a grouping characterised by custom and informality.
They had never been considered as a formally constituted institution, and
moreover no law ever created or even mentioned their federation as being
ofýcially acknowledged. Yet themonarchy was keen to give the Six Corps an
ofýcial existence and to recognize its political structure as a representative
body for commercial interests.
The Six Corps comprised the drapers, the grocers, the haberdashers,
the furriers, the hosiers, and the goldsmiths. These guilds were in permanent
ideological and material conþict with the craftsmen of the capital city.6 In
particular, merchants aimed to oversee manufacturing activities, using their
economic and honoriýc status as a pretext. The Six Corps developed an
increasing sense of their superiority and dignity as providers of a variety
of services for the Court, by supplying armies as well as the main civic
institutions, such as the town hall, the merchant’s court, large parishes, etc.7
6. M.MARRAUD, 2014.
7. N. LYON-CAEN & M.MARRAUD, 2014.
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Prominent merchants supplied uniforms, clothes, furs, jewellery, candles
to the Maison du roi or to the royal stables. In itself, the concept of civic
notability or prominence rested on this ability some merchant guilds had to
set up their members in a single chain of linked powers centred on certain
typical bourgeois areas within the town.8 One of the Six Corps’ aims was
to obtain for each of them the status of corps, which meant recognition as
being a part of the body politic, as opposed to the more basic status of a
community. Even though they did not derive their status from the crown, the
Six Corps des marchands were tempted to operate as if they did. In effect,
the Six Corps’ objective was to establish merchant prominence whenever
trade, town and state encountered each other.
Somehow, the successes of the Six Corps as an informal authority
representing wholesalers’ interests backýred: they attracted close attention
from the king, in particular on ýnancial grounds. From the Nine Years’ War
onwards, in the 1690s, the Six Corps became the target of tax policies which
sought to fund military expenditure. Throughout the period, Louis XIV’s
ambition was to learn more about the proýt merchants made from trade
during the war, in order to tax it. The only way to achieve this objective
was to obtain information from the guilds themselves.9 For twenty years,
until the death of Louis XIV and the ensuing period known as the Regency,
government policy with regard to the Six Corps materialised through the
creation of ofþces, which consisted in the sale by the state of a variety of
new public or semi-public functions. These ofþces did not confer major or
signiýcant privileges on the holder. No speciýc responsibilitieswere attached
to them, except infringing upon those of the guilds: for example paymasters,
inspectors of the registers, archive custodians. Yet they encroached on the
guilds’ traditional prerogatives. Thus the ofþces operated as a means of
intimidation: to protect their status and rights, the guilds were compelled to
purchase the ofþces or buy off government threats. Between 1691 and 1710,
royal edicts and contracts with moneylenders, who advanced the capital for
ofþces to be sold, demanded that guilds of merchants and craftsmen in the
kingdom pay 20.9 million livres to the Royal Treasury.10 The Six Corps
des marchands had to contribute 15% of the total. This share was clearly
disproportionate: for instance, in 1753, the Six Corps’ contribution to the
capitation, a direct tax, represented 10% of the sum raised in Paris and 54%
8. L. CROQ, 2007.
9. M.MARRAUD, 2012.
10. Archives Nationales (A.N.), G7 1726, D’Argenson’s answer to the proposition of
conýrming merchants’ and artisans’ mastership and making it hereditary, 1710.
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of the tax paid by the 120 Parisian guilds.11 Their members, between 3,000
and 4,000, did not exceed 15 or 20% of all the Parisian guilds’ masters at
that time.






1691, ofÿces of juré or garde 3,682,672 lt. 624,000 lt. 17
1694, ofÿces of accounts auditors 4,926,915 lt. 440,000 lt. 9
1702, ofÿces of administrator of the common treasury 3,216,260 lt. 550,000 lt. 17
1704, ofÿces of controller of weights and measures 4,000,000 lt. 550,000 lt. 14
1726, conÿrmation taxes circa 6,000,000 lt. 429,518 lt. 7
1745, ofÿces of guilds’ inspector 6,718,049 lt. 780,000 lt. 12
Sources. (a) Mercure de France, Paris: Lacombe, October 1768, p. 180.
(b) A.N., KK 1340-1342, Six Corps’ registers of deliberations, eighteenth century.
In away, on the issueof indebtedness, theSixCorps stoodat the forefront
of commerce as great cities stood before smaller ones: in proportion, great
cities were much more indebted because of the ýscal potential they has,
relying on stronger public and borrowing authorities, on wider facilities
to transfer the cost onto the wealthiest levels of society or those with
the highest rate of consumption, while they still boasted a permanently
healthier ýnancial state than the monarchy could achieve.12 This was how it
worked with the Six Corps. The size of guilds like the haberdashers (more
than 2,000 members) or the grocers (around 700 members), added to the
prerogatives they possessed over the supply of the Court (like the drapers
and the goldsmiths), and the public rights they exercised over the urban
population, were all factors which helped them to bear a signiýcant share
of the costs.
Their economic power is reþected in the volume of rentes or annuities
they paid each year to lenders. In effect, to meet the king’s demands, the Six
Corps had a habit of borrowing money. The government imposed an overall
contribution on each guild, which was free to choose the methods to collect
money from its members. The guild paid its contribution by means of loans
which were underwritten by the masters who received bonds. Most of the
time they redistributed the debt among the guilds’ richest members: in 1696,
11. A.N., H1 1559, “Arrest qui prouve les etats de répartition de la capitation dressés
pour l’année 1753”.
12. J. FÉLIX, 2000.
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a mere 197 haberdashers (10% of the members) advanced the 200,000 lt. the
guild needed to pay to the king, and just 55 grocers (8% of the members)
did the same for the 45,000 lt. their guild had to lay out.13 Later, in 1714, the
circle of haberdashers’ lenders could extend to a larger social base and the
bonds they issued acquired a higher public value and a stronger guarantee.
At this point, only 11 of the 57 new lenders came from the guild’s ranks, and
14% of the extraordinary total of 662,300 lt. raised was borne by this small
group.14In themeantime, all the guild’s loans had turned into ordinary public
ones thanks to the expansion of a real city-wide credit market. Prominent
ofýceholders or ýnanciers could now operate within it.
The context of widespread war explains such a change. Transferring
credit to corps intermédiaires or, in other words, using the ýnancial
intermediation of corporate bodies to raise capital, was the usual way the
king sustained war. The Parisian municipality was the most important of
them all.15 But in reality, and in addition to state-issued bonds (rentes sur
l’Hotel de Ville de Paris), many ýnanciers and royal agents also borrowed by
issuing a variety of bonds and others ýnancial assets which had an impact
on the liquidity of the market in the 1700s.16 Everywhere in the kingdom,
minor local and judicial courts both consumed and generated different kinds
of credit, to the extent that many of their functions and recruiting practices
suffered enormously from royal taxation.17Other corporate institutions, like
the main guilds, were asked to bear all the costs. Of course they agreed, in
exchange for conýrmation or extension of their privileges. This is the model
of corporate ýnancial intermediation David Bien put forward in a famous
article published in 1988.18 However, as we will see, it did not work very
well, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century. Moreover it
had much to do with the model of a ýscal-military state turning most of the
regulatory relationships it had with public institutions into monetary ones as
a means of covering immediate expenses. More than other countries, France
had the capacity to mobilise resources for military purposes.19
13. A.N., MC XXXIX 187, haberdashers’ and grocers’ deliberations, 26th-28th January
1696.
14. A.N., MC XXXIX 271, haberdashers’ contract, 18th November 1713.
15. K. BÉGUIN, 2012, p. 219-257.
16. G. ROWLANDS, 2012, p. 72-89.
17. V.MEYZIE, 2012.
18. D. D. BIEN, 1988.
19. J. FÉLIX & F. TALLETT, 2009.
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It is important to note here that the whole issue of guild debt bears little
relationship to the idea of the guilds’ carelessness or their corrupt practices
(even though such criticisms cannot be totally dismissed). In practice, the
merchants of the Six Corps, several of whom were heads of major trading
companies, were well versed in book-keeping and running large businesses.
There is no reason to doubt these merchants’ abilities to administer the Six
Corps’ common treasury or funds. Within the guilds, access to corporate
responsibilities was normally restricted to the very successful shop owners,
and measured in terms of their long-established wealth.20 In other words, the
guilds’ ofýcials were well qualiýed to manage their ýnances. These were
necessary conditions for anyone to make a successful attempt in guilds’
elections to the main posts of garde or juré. The prominent position of the
city put the ‘rulers’ of the Six Corps in an absolutely dominant position
for dealing with the private and public credit markets. So, the question of
guild debt must be handled with some caution by historians. It has to be
considered as part of a wider process of assessment of taxable wealth by the
state for the purpose of funding the king’s wars. And this was particularly
true in the case of the Six Corps.
It is now possible to examine the extent to which Louis XIV’s reign
can be considered as particularly harsh in its tax policy towards the guilds.
Under Louis XV, between 1745 and 1770, the Six Corps lent about 3,583,000
livres to the government. By comparison, between 1690 and 1715, they lent
only 2,877,000 livres, or a sum which was 20% less.21 The ýnancial impact
of the Austrian War of Succession (1741-1748) and the Seven Years’ War
(1756-1763) on the Parisian guilds was remarkably similar to – if not larger
than – the later wars of Louis XIV’s reign. So eighteenth-century royal
policy was clearly built on ýscal desire to keep pace with economic growth
and to siphon off part of its proýt by continuing to tax merchant guilds’
treasuries rather than private incomes.
2. Ascertaining and qualifying the guilds’ debt
In the eighteenth century, the monarchy did not simply continue to levy
taxes on urban institutions. It did so while at the same time, seeking to exert
control over the guilds’ accounts.On3rdMarch1716, a royalcommissionwas
created for that purpose. It emerged from the Regency government’s wish to
settle war debts the king’s death left behind. As with similar commissions,
20. M.MARRAUD, 2009, p. 123-172.
21. A.N., H2 2120, Taxes paid by the Six Corps of merchants since 1691 [circa 1760].
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its power proceeded from the King’s Council and its members were selected
from among the most able and senior magistrates. It was chaired initially
by a conseiller d’État, which was the highest magistracy position of the
whole kingdom, after the chancelier de France.22 The aim of this newly
established commission was to audit the guilds’ accounts. In theory the
guilds had from this point on to submit their registers to the king’s ofýcers
once a year. That had never previously been the case. What was initially
intended was as an “extraordinary” royal commission soon transformed
into a standing one, as its members claimed guilds had to submit to their
authority. From 1716 onwards, and for a period of more than thirty years,
the Six Corps opposed the commission’s activities, on the grounds of their
long-established autonomy in administering their property, whether or not
this brought them beneýcial incomes.
In eighteenth-century France, the guilds considered themselves moral
persons with ýnancial autonomy. Autonomy was the very foundation of
any community. Management of internal rights (like raising taxes on its
members) or external rights (like levying taxes on goods) were two aspects
of unitary existence as a public body. Consequently, the Six Corps perceived
the work of certiýcation or invalidation which that royal commission sought
to exercise over their traditional customary rights as having no legitimacy.
In doing so, they came into conþict with ministers. The Six Corps refused
to present their registers. Although many other guilds followed suit, the
Six Corps were more successful. Overall, crafts guilds’ resistance to the
commission simply failed: as early as 1717, for example, the small guild
of the public letter-writers complied with the commission’s wishes, the
goldsmiths submitted in 1723, and the pastry-cooks in 1726.23
Taking advantage of their status as corporate bodies, the Parisian
merchants alleged that they could not be equated with other guilds, and
therefore could not be asked to comply with the Royal Council’s decisions
pertaining to a guild’s debts. The booksellers expressly contended too
that it was impossible, with such a measure, to equate them with simple
craftsmen’s guilds.24 Many rulings were made in the 1720s, some of them
involving severe measures, such as penalty fees in the case of delay or
late compliance, or civil imprisonment against the jurés or gardes, the
ofýcers whose personal responsibility was to rule the guilds and to keep
their registers. As a result of such rulings, after 1740 it was a commission
22. A.N., V7 421A-B, verdicts of the commission of guilds debts revision, 1716-1789.
23. A.N., V7 421B-443A, audits of guilds’ accounts.
24. A.N., V7 421A, verdict of the commission, 17th March 1723.
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member who collected the guilds’ surplus and executed debt payment. As
can be expected, the Six Corps were the last of the guilds to obey: they
surrendered only in 1739, a means of asserting, once again, their distinctive
status as merchants and notable men of the city by contrast with craftsmen
who had to act upon the king’s will long before they did. In 1741, they still
wrote in their register of deliberations:
“Until now, through all the steps they took […] the Six Corps have always been
told that they would be distinguished from the arts et métiers, and there is more
than one reason for hoping it is so.”25
The Six Corps were particularly fearful of the way people and private
customers, and their public creditors too, would react to seeing their
accounts checked by high magistrates whose function seemed so similar
to that of a special court. The royal commission on guild debts insisted
that they submit all of their accounts going back to 1689, or half a century
earlier, the very moment when the guilds had had to buy royal ofýces for
the ýrst time. Nevertheless the Six Corps, sure of the previous lieutenant
général de policeMarville’s favour, were still able to secure his presidency
of the commission in 1755.26 The Paris lieutenant général de police was
in charge of all aspects of the life of the city, including corporate urban
institutions.
It is difýcult to explain why, in the second half of the eighteenth
century, such powerful guilds as the Six Corps were still confronted with
the problem of debt or lack of revenue. The archives of Parisian guilds
were destroyed by arson during the Commune of 1871, and only scraps of
information still remain. The King’s Council constantly argued that guilds
were prisoners of a self-perpetuating debt producing interest on arrears
and that they could not escape from this evil. However this argument is
shaky. Firstly, any urban community ýnanced its debt through short-term
credit operations, coming up against a constantly extended single sum
borrowed, renewing it almost like a perpetual one, and making it very long
to amortize because of a succession of manipulations and conversions.27
Urban corporate bodies were not put under royal guardianship anyway.
Secondly, from 1726, the government ceased to manipulate currency. By
this time, guilds had taken various opportunities during the Regency to
convert their loans into new ones by reducing the interest rate they paid to
their lenders. Annual repayment had always been the biggest obstacle the
25. A.N., KK 1342, Six Corps’ register of deliberations, 4th January 1741.
26. A.N., KK 1342, Six Corps’ register of deliberations, 3rd March 1755.
27. M. COURDURIÉ, 1974, p. 110-113.
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monarchy came up against in trying to abolish its debt.28 In the absence of
primary sources lost in 1871, it would seem that the main Parisian guilds
were successful in converting at a lower rate the interest rates on the bonds
they had issued. Under Louis XV, as already mentioned, the Six Corps
were still able to borrow for the beneýt of the Royal Treasury. In 1745,
they contributed 43% of the total value of the ofþces purchased by Parisian
guilds to meet demands in capital from the Royal Treasury. In 1759, the Six
Corps complained that they were overloaded with 600,000 livres of annual
interest for money borrowed for the king,29 most of which, 514,000 livres,
came from a loan issued the previous year to pay a conýrmation tax.30 The
mighty drapers and haberdashers managed to reduce the loans they owed
from a capital of 400,000 to 30,000 livres between 1704 and 1745 because
of their control over the Parisian Cloth Market (la Halle aux draps). That
is the main reason why the king kept them under his control during the
entire eighteenth century, and kept taxing the drapers and haberdashers,
transforming a temporary measure into a permanent tax on goods delegated
to the guilds.31
From these ýgures, it is possible to infer that the guilds’ long term debt
issued on behalf of the king was minimal. It was all the more successfully
contained since the Six Corps improved their annual rates of new masters
admitted to the guilds. Among the haberdashers, the average grew from 90
per year in the 1730s to 140 in the 1770s.32 So the entrance fees increased in
the same proportion. In fact the number of new masters admitted within the
Six Corps exactly mirrored the peaks of royal taxation on their treasuries.33
Indeed, the ýnancial balance they reported annually to the commission
showed a surplus. For example, during the 1730s, the annual revenues of the
guild of grocers already exceeded expenditure by 20 to 50%.34Their ýnancial
situation was very different from that which obtained during Louis XIV’s
wars. Even royal texts establishing new taxes on all guilds of the kingdom
in 1745 had to acknowledge that these were the consequence of the guilds’
28. F. R. VELDE and D. R.WEIR, 1992.
29. A.C.C.I.P., X 1-00(1), “Memoire des Six Corps contre les brevets hereditaires”,
1759, p. 2.
30. A.C.C.I.P., X 1-00(1), “Memoire contre le projet d’accorder à toutes personnes sans
distinction la faculté de faire le commerce en gros” 1759, p. 6.
31. A.N., H2 2165, “Observations des gardes en charge du corps de la draperie-mercerie,
régisseurs des droits de la halle aux draps de Paris”, 1781.
32. A.N., Y 9323-9332, registers of mastership receptions in the Parisian guilds,
eighteenth century.
33. M.MARRAUD, 2010.
34. A.N., V7 428, audit of grocers’ accounts.
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regained ýnancial health. Therefore, one can argue that the government, by
forcing guilds into debt, enabled the king to spearhead a campaign whereby
guilds had to submit to the authority of the royal commission, and over their
accounts and registers to the king’s magistrates.
If the Six Corps was not particularly in debt, we can speculate what
the purpose of the royal commission was. Some in the commission said that
the gardes had been given too much authority to levy extraordinary fees on
goods to service the interests of the sums the king asked them to borrow on
his behalf. Having denounced the high prices that ensued, the commission
should normally have pointed at the necessity of reducing taxes weighing
on goods and cancelling all the corporate debts.35 Such an argument
could not be reconciled with the fact that the Royal Treasury continued
to transfer ýscal competence onto urban corporate institutions throughout
the eighteenth century. What is certain is that the commission’s aim was to
obtain disclosure of the guilds’ accounts. It wanted to force disclosure of the
guilds’ budgets because of suspected concealed ýnancial techniques. If we
look at the wording of the king’s orders, we can see how he made use of a
wide set of condemnations and disapproving sentences that all belong to the
language of reproof. The king’s orders paved the way for a series of political
sanctions whereby he laid the foundation of his guiding ýnancial principles.
That is the most striking feature of the policy of government control: from
the 1740s onwards, the monarchy challenged old institutional autonomies by
making clear its intention to punish. ‘Omission, disorder, lack of discipline’
were condemned by the king.36 In other words the magistrates were more
interested in denunciating the accounts than in simply checking them. After
all, the commission was at its core a judicial body.
How did it proceed when examining the accounts? In practice, all of
the guilds’ expenditures resulting from the everyday guild activities were
struck off: they were considered to be useless or suspicious. This is the
case, for instance, of expenditure for candle gifts at Candlemas, of costs for
new parish bells when the guilds acted as godfather, costs for renewal or
repair of liturgical objects, donations in kind to guild ofýcers or servants.
In 1766 the hosiers expressly complained about the submission of accounts
to which they were forced.37 Even charity expenses which the haberdashers’
gardes incurred for poor members were deleted on the pretext that the
35. A.N., V7 443B, “arrêt du Conseil”, 7th December 1739.
36. A.N., V7 421A, ruling of the commission, 7th September 1726.
37. A.N., KK 1342, Six Corps’ register of deliberations, 22nd April 1766.
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lieutenant général de police had not stamped the lists of beneýciaries.38
Suspecting the guilds’ gardes of protecting many of the members, and
of attempting to reduce their contribution to the royal taxes, the king’s
lieutenant wanted to make sure they deserved to be cared for in that way. It
is true that charity expenditure saw its share of the guilds’ budget increase
in the eighteenth century: the goldsmiths devoted 25% of their outgoings
to it.39 Among the grocers, money shared out to poor masters increased by
400% between 1709 and 1760, whereas the total number of masters only
rose by 25% during the same period.40 It seems obvious that the gardes’
policy tended more and more to protect the weaker shops or businesses
from any selling off or removal from the list of guilds. Maybe this was the
paradox of the tax levies by the king reinforcing such community feeling
within the merchant guilds. However, while auditing the accounts, the
commission’s magistrates matched them against public accounting values
where the notion of corporate membership was intentionally omitted, as
this was illegal from the royal viewpoint. Submission of the guilds’ registers
meant that an institution of self-government was now subjected to a system
of restriction. Guilds’ ýnancial as well as moral authority was transferred to
a bureaucracy of royal agents. The latter aimed to normalize the functions
of the guilds by applying to them a model taken from the administration of
public funds. Whatever the Six Corps sought to gain in asking for a general
amnesty in 1766, they never obtained it.41After the restoration of the guilds’
organization in August 1776, the commission was renewed in 1778 and
operated unchanged up until 1790.
The second purpose of the commission was to label the guilds’ debt, to
re-categorize it in accordance with the king’s wishes, that is to say to make
it a royal debt. Insofar as guilds’ debts ensued from purchase of royal ofýces
and were serviced by a tax, the debt could be considered as nothing less than
the result of guilds handling royal money. Drawing on its self-conception as
a general public body, the monarchy considered it its duty to include and
guarantee any form of public credit or exchange. Identifying the guilds’
treasury principally as a debt, and furthermore as a royal debt, the king
found the best way to ask for this ritual of the submission of the registers.
This meant moving the guilds within the king’s direct jurisdiction, thereby
integrating the question of accounts within the wider new interpretation
38. A.N., V7 435, audit of haberdashers’ accounts, 1771-1774.
39. A.N., T 1490(232), “Compte de Mr Louis Mercier, année 1750”.
40. Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris, ms CP 4999, grocers’ accounts, 1709;
A.N., V7 428, veriýcations of grocers’ accounts, 1760.
41. A.N., KK 1342, Six Corps’ register of deliberations, 8th November 1766.
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of the guilds’ political independence. So the driving force behind the
commission’s work appears to have been the political will to ofýcially
install the higher royal jurisdiction, and then, through the agency of a debt
administration, to try to classify guild funds as royal ones.
Consequences were not slow to follow. A series of royal decrees were
issued in the 1740s which emphasized strict monarchical control over the
Six Corps’ debts, and, more importantly, over their revenue and expenditure.
The Royal Council used its power to closely control all the aspects of the
guilds’ daily life, in particular allotting a scale of maximum expenditure to
activities such as confraternities’ outgoings, meals, or journeys to meet the
courts of justice or the ministers. Even the smallest repair costs to guilds’
property needed to be stamped and approved by the Paris lieutenant général
de police. All the pensions the guilds paid to the poor had to undergo
the same treatment. The commission oversaw the implementation of its
decisions and invalidated every instance of overspending. The accountant
garde even had to pledge his private responsibility in case of liabilities.
Table 2. Goldsmiths’ itemized expenditure in 1742, as stipulated (i) by that





Religious duties 2,500 lt. 2,200 lt.
Board outgoings 1,800 lt.
4,800 lt.
including meal outgoings
Meals outgoings 3,500 lt.
New Year’s Day presents outgoings 350 lt.
Journeys outgoings 700 lt.
Gardes’ fees 1,300 lt. 1,300 lt.
Source. A.N., KK 1351, goldsmiths’ register of deliberations, April 1742 ;
idem, AD/XI/17, arrêt du Conseil, 17th November 1742.
A lot of clues point to the conclusion that thegardes had no great respect
for the articles include in the King’s Council rulings of 1742, especially those
relating to charities: in the 1750s, the goldsmiths’ expenditure exceeded
between 15 and 35% the maximum ýxed by the decree. In 1750, the guild’s
administrative costs reached a peak of 80% more than the upper limit the
decree ýxed.42 The grocers acted in the same manner: during the six years
that followed the decree of 1742, their board overspending even increased
42. A.N., V7 436, audit of goldsmiths’ accounts.
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from 5 to 25%.43 Even though the Royal council got the gardes involved
in the decree-writing process, clearly they were not able to conform to the
ýnancial regime the king asked them to adopt. Only the drapers, since they
formed the very ýrst of the Six Corps, appeared to show consideration for
all the clauses, even though it is possible they enjoyed preferential treatment:
the magistrates’ reports mention the economic power of the guilds and their
ability to supply the Court and the army.44 In 1767 the Six Corps obtained the
cancellation of the unfavourable rulings the commission passed concerning
the hosiers’ accounts.45 The commission’s decisions all had the distinctive
feature of resulting from a negotiation that inevitably involved the political
and economic weight of the guilds acting for or against them.
The fact remains that the monarchy worked towards the rationalisation
of the guilds’ ýnance using criteria drawn from a world totally alien to that
of the guilds. In fact, the king dispossessed the Six Corps of their ýnancial
liberty, introducing ýnancial principles relevant to royal companies or
ofýceholders. This policy was pursued until in 1744 a decree laid down
general regulations that gave supervision of the Six Corps to the lieutenant
général de police.46 As a result, this ofýcer had authority to sign the
accountant’s register; he also checked bills, ýnes or conýscation of goods;
he prohibited discounts on mastership fees (droits de maîtrise); he vetted
any borrowing request. Some of the lieutenant de police’s authority over
guilds was already in existence; but the royal decree of 1744 formulated
a clearer and stronger regulation of the Six Corps. Goldsmiths referred
to measures of ‘servitude’ and ‘degradation’ in speaking of these new
regulations.47 In spite of this decree, commission magistrates remained in
overall charge of judging the accounts annually, and in 1770 the Six Corps
failed in an attempt to be accountable to the lieutenant only.48 The king was
permanently suspicious of the closeness that his lieutenant could develop in
the long run with institutions he too ruled as regulatory protector.
Although the Six Corpswere required in 1739 to submit their registers,
the commission waited till the 1750s to actually monitor these documents.
We can speculate that this extension of time was meant to put pressure
on the guilds and make them recognise the king’s potential authority. The
43. A.N., V7 428, audit of grocers’ accounts.
44. S. L. KAPLAN, 2001, p. 51-56; A.N., V7 428, veriýcation of drapers’ accounts.
45. A.N., KK 1342, Six Corps’ register of deliberations, 18th March 1767.
46. A.N., AD/XI/17, “arrêt du Conseil”, 31st July 1744.
47. A.N., KK 1352, goldsmiths’ register of deliberations, 28th April 1773.
48. A.N., KK 1342, Six Corps’ register of deliberations, 15th December 1770.
Mathieu Marraud
185
Royal Treasury was preparing itself to impose new taxes on the guilds after
the War of the Polish Succession, which had just ended (1739). Sixteen years
later, this potential turned into actual administrative control. Neither refusal
nor hesitation from the Six Corps was possible any more. Accounts were
submitted from that moment on, with ten to ýfteen years’ delay before they
were ofýcially judged and validated. The accession in 1745 of Machault
d’Arnouville to the post of contrôleur général des þnances visibly marked
a renewal in the government’s agenda and relationship with city institutions.
Liberal thinking was clearly introduced into political practices by the
intendant des þnances Trudaine up until these years.49 The guilds then had
to obey new procedures for bookkeeping through licit and illicit ýnancial
categories. From the monarchy’s point of view, the community was no
longer a daily professional link between masters but an establishment for
collecting and paying ýscal duties, for entering the service of consumers and
providers under the king’s regulation. At the end of the process, of course,
it was no longer useful to allow the guilds to sustain a credit relationship
that the monarchy felt strong enough to guarantee by itself. So the abolition
of the guilds in 1776 can be understood as the outcome of an evolution
that transformed customary trade institutions into state intermediary banks.
Once the royal debt owed to them was annulled there was no reason for
the corporations’ continued existence. Doing away with them also meant
removing a troublesome creditor. By restoring the corporate order and the
Six Corps almost immediately themselves (August 1776), once more the
king put guilds back into a subordinate role as suppliers of money: they
no longer had the full revenue of their entrance fees at their disposal, but
only a quarter of the total; the three-quarters that remained was directly
transferred to the king’s treasury.50
*
From many points of view, the alleged insolvency of a famous
commercial federation like the Six Corps des marchands de Paris was
nothing other than an opportunity for the king to achieve several objectives.
Firstly, to scrutinise theýnanceof corporatebodieswithaview toaggregating
themwith what was called the denier du roi [the king’s monies]; secondly, to
put every ýnancial activity in the kingdom under royal control; and thirdly,
to illustrate the king’s power of categorization and political reshaping of
traditional customs into public administrative practices. It is difýcult to
49. P.MINARD, 1998, p. 316-321.
50. Bnf, F-21193(22), édit d’août 1776.
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imagine that, without their increasing role in bringing down the royal debts,
the Six Corps would have developed the kind of views that they did about
their public authority, public utility, even the bien public they worked to, or
the service they rendered to the public, which the documents they produced
mentioned as far back as the 1710-1720s. Thus, all customary referents
slowly disappeared from their textual practices (the appeal to precedent,
civic privilege or liberty) in favour of the characteristic vocabulary used
within royal institutions.
Independently of all the meanings attached to such notions, the guilds’
accounts entered a public sphere in so far as they happened to be checked
by a public institution, in other words an institution shaped by a royal
delegation, which could only be expressed in terms of puissance publique.
And that was the way the government understood it. In reality there was
no policy on the publishing of the guilds’ accounts by the monarchy. Yet
the royal magistrates in charge of controlling the guilds during the second
half of the eighteenth century thought they really were disclosing and
punishing old-fashioned mismanagement, modernizing them via the same
public norms that all treasurers or tax collectors had to uphold and comply
with. In fact, they took over control of corporate bodies which actually had
agreed to act as intermediaries for the king’s debts and were excessively
self-governing in the way they managed it. That is the main reason why
some great merchant guilds like the Six Corps had to be ýnally incorporated
into the royal administration, and why the ýnancial control by the state
was used to facilitate this political integration. It is possible to argue that
guilds’ insolvency, rather than being another impediment to the ýnances of
the state, created an opportunity for the government to manage the guilds
as a kind of royal service, thereby allowing the king to interfere in their
ýnancial proceedings, and then to cancel their time-honoured autonomy.
In this context, transparency meant making use of sovereign power to force
guilds into releasing their accounts and denying them corporate autonomy
in the management of their debts, which thus became and were declared to
be public debts. From this point of view, the abolition of the guilds in 1776
was merely an ultimate integration of credit from trade and merchants into
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